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Medieval and early post medieval firearms and artil-
lery were the subject matter of the 9th fascicle of ‘Fasciculi 
Archaeologiae Historicae’, published in 1996, which con-
tained the materials of the 1st International Colloquium on 
Arms and Armour, held in Malbork in 1994. The present pub-
lication is devoted to the outcomes of most recent scientific 
investigations conducted by specialists in arms and armour, 
both archaeologists and historians. The first two papers deal 
with Greek fire, which cannot be classed as a type of artillery, 
but to some extent, seems to be its forerunner. It appears that 
Greek fire was also used outside Byzantium, at least by the 
Bulgarians and the Cumans, who, however, did not produce 
this type of weapon themselves.
The following papers discuss the use of artillery and fire-
arms at the close of the Middle Ages and the beginning of 
post medieval times in the Polish, Bohemian and Teutonic 
armies. All these papers as well as the papers dealing with 
Greek fire are based on written records and the remaining 
three contributions rely on archaeological sources.
The three papers in question are based on archaeological 
weapon finds coming from excavations carried out on 18th- 
and early 19th-century battlefields. These excavations permit 
archaeologists to draw conclusions not only about the artil-
lery and firearms which were in use at that time, but also the 
contemporary battle array.
The issue of arms and armour in past centuries, firearms 
and artillery included, is going to be further discussed in 
‘Fasciculi Archaeologiae Historicae’ and looked upon from 
the perspective of production technology in the near future.
Łódź, October 2012
(translated by Zuzanna Poklewska-Parra)
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ADRIAN MANDZY
USING MUNITIONS AND UNIT FRONTAGE: 
NEW EVIDENCE ABOUT THE RUSSIAN MAIN BATTLE LINE AT POLTAVA (1709)
The Battle of Poltava reached its crescendo with an 
all out assault of the Swedish army on the Russian camp 
(Fig. 1). Swedish troops, among the best disciplined in the 
world, had known many victories over the Slavs and one 
good march could break the Russian line. Once this line 
was broken, panic would set in as the remaining Russian 
troops would begin to flee across the Vorskva River. With 
a limited line of retreat, the outnumbered Swedish forces 
would once again inflict a major defeat on the backwards 
enemy, much like they did at Narva nine years earlier.
Shortly after 9:00 in the morning, Tsar Peter the 1st 
(Pyotr Alexeyevich Romanov) ordered his troops to form 
up in two lines in the open ground in front of the forti-
fied camp to face the oncoming northerners. The first line 
Fig. 1. G. C. Pingeling’s Plan 1741, Courtesy of Aleksandr Ianovych, the former Director of the National Historical Cultural Preserve 
„Fields of the Battle of Poltava”.
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consisted of twenty-four infantry battalions and the second 
had eighteen battalions. Between each of these battalions 
were the three-pound regimental guns, which were small 
light field pieces that traveled with the foot battalions. 
Larger artillery pieces remained in the camp, but were 
placed on elevated positions, so that they could fire over 
the heads of the Russian troops and provide covering fire. 
To the right of the infantry, Peter deployed eleven regiments 
of dragoons, and six regiments of dragoons secured the left 
Russian flank. A small reserve remained uncommitted and 
was available to fill in any gaps that appeared. 
Mounted on a his horse Finette, the Tsar moved out 
in front of his troops as Orthodox priests sprinkled Holy 
Water on the troops going into combat. By 9:45, the Swed-
ish troops had evoked Jesus and began their move forward. 
According to the popular myths that arose after the Musco-
vite victory, the two armies were approximately 800 meters 
apart as the two massive war machines began to close in on 
each other. From the start of the Swedish march, the Rus-
sian artillery gave fire on the advancing Swedes. When the 
Swedes moved closer, the regimental guns began to fire 
round shot and as the Balts moved closer to the Slavic lines, 
the guns fired canister. According to Von Weihe, a Swed-
ish officer who had taken part in the attack, the artillery 
“mown down the troops.”1
At around forty meters, the Russian infantry fired on 
their oncoming blue-coated adversaries. Yet the Swedish 
line continued to advance. As trained, the Swedes halted, 
fired a volley and then charged the Russian line. The first 
Russian line on the Swedish right began to be pushed back 
and Russian troops began to flee. On the Swedish left, the 
Russian Guard regiments exploited a gap in the Swedish 
line and began to push back the Swedish advance. With not 
enough troops to cover the open ground, a gap appeared 
in the Swedish line. As the Swedish attack began to break 
up, it stalled and the initiative passed to the Russians. The 
Muscovites began to send in more troops and the Swed-
ish lines began to sway. As the Swedes began to withdraw, 
their departure from the field of glory quickly turned into 
a route. Before noon, the new model army created by Peter 
had changed the balance of power in Europe forever.2
This story, more or less, has been told for almost three 
hundred years. The greatness of Peter, the superiority of 
Russian firepower over Swedish bayonets, and the overall 
folly of the Swedish invasion has been analyzed, studied 
and taught to generations of military officers throughout 
the world. Napoleon, before advancing on to Moscow in 
1812, wrestled with these issues, as did Imperial German 
and Nazi officers during the two world wars. Yet how 
much of this story is true and how much it was fabricated 
1 P. England, The Battle That Shook Europe: Poltava and 
the Birth of the Russian Empire, London 1992.
2 Ch. Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West, London 
1981.
to further a political agenda? Accounts from the battle are 
mostly one sided. With the destruction of the Swedish army 
at Poltava and the loss of the Royal Chancellery, the Swed-
ish documentary record is rather sparse. The relatively high 
level of literacy in early modern Sweden allowed for the 
survivors from the campaign who eventually returned to 
Sweden after years or even decades of captivity to com-
piled memories, but how accurate and selective was their 
memory remains unclear. Worse is the fact that generals 
and officers often try to shift blame for failure on others 
and often over or under estimate, consciously or uncon-
sciously, particular events. The documentary records from 
the Cossack faired even worse, as these were intentionally 
destroyed in 1775 by Peter’s greatest emulator, the Empress 
Catherine. Therefore, the best primary historical documen-
tary information comes from Russian sources.
These sources, however, are also rather selective. Like 
the painter who composes a portrait for a particular audi-
ence, any records concerning the de facto founder of the 
Russian Empire are inevitably positive. Given that Peter 
was not above modifying history to fit into his particular 
perspective, politically sensitive materials would undoubt-
edly been changed to fit the official version of events. Criti-
cism of the regime or of the Tsar was not tolerated during 
Peter’s reign, so it is unlikely any record of discord would 
have survived into the twenty-first century.
Yet some variations do show up in the documentary 
record. Most pictures of the battle, either as specific draw-
ing of the battlefield or as background setting for heroic 
portraits, illustrate the Russian camp. Most often the camp 
is shown to be almost square in shape and fortified on three 
sides with massive earthen walls, ditches and flat firing 
platforms. The official plan of the battle, often referred 
to as Peter’s Plan, shows a very formal, but much longer, 
rectangular shape. Other illustrations, however, show an 
irregular trapezoid shaped structure. More recent twentieth 
century reconstructions, such as that of Bennedich’s plan 
from 1911, try to place an irregular square shaped trape-
zoid on top of the current topography.3 Unfortunately, these 
more recent reconstructions were influenced by the series 
of military fortifications that were built on the battlefield in 
the mid nineteenth century. 
Indeed, shortly after the Crimean War, the Poltava 
military school, which was initially established by Peter 
to commemorate his victory, decided to re-create a series 
of fortifications on the battlefield in time for the 150-year 
anniversary. While popular assumptions suggest that 
these recreations were built on the ruins of the previous 
earthworks, we know that in the early years of the nine-
teenth century the entire battlefield area was evened out 
so that Tsar Alexander I could have an unobstructed view 
3 K. Bennedich, Karl XII:s krigföring 1707-1709 och krigs-
skådeplatsens natur och kultur,1911.
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of the Grand Review of the Russian Army during the 1809 
Centennial Celebrations. Generally, such leveling of the 
ground – filling in holes by scrapping off the top soil from 
high points – is limited in its scope, especially before the 
advent of steam and gas powered earth moving machines. 
Yet in the Russian Empire, serfs were plentiful, cheap and 
were employed in various mundane tasks. While we have 
no documentary evidence about how much of the terrain 
was moved, the presence of His Imperial Majesty would 
undoubtedly have resulted in a concerted effort to make the 
battlefield as royalty friendly as possible.
Thus, when we began to look at the battle, what evi-
dence could be used to challenge or even verify the offi-
cial tale told by the state? How did the main attack on the 
Russian camp develop? How close did the Swedish troops 
come to victory? Prior to the archaeological survey of what 
is thought to be the main battlefront area, we conducted 
a re-creation of the battle lines from the existing Russian 
Orders of Battle. A record of where each regiment stood in 
relationship to each other was compiled on the direct orders 
of Peter. This information is commonly available and was 
published along the edge of the map shortly after the battle 
as a record of Peter’s accomplishment. Often referred to as 
Tsar Peter’s Plan, this map lists the Russian and Swedish 
Order of Battle along the bottom of the page. 
From this list we can determine that the first line 
contained twenty-four infantry battalions. A battalion, 
according to the Regulations of 1704, consisted of four 
companies of musketeers.4 The reforms of 1708 stripped 
the single company of grenadiers from the regiment and 
placed them in converged Grenadier regiments, with only 
a few select regiments keeping their grenadiers with the 
parental unit. To augment the firepower of the Russian 
infantry, two three-pound guns were deployed with each 
regiment. The two Guard regiments were significantly 
larger. Preobrazhanski Guard Regiment had four battalions 
and a special unit of bombadiers equipped with hand mor-
tars. The Semenovski Guard Regiment was also enlarged 
and had three battalions. To augment the firepower of these 
two privileged units, the guard kept their grenadiers and 
had enlarged batteries of regimental artillery.
The battalion guns had an interesting history. These 
guns were designed to keep pace with an infantry regiment 
and were light enough to be man-handled by the infantry. 
The older regimental guns in the Russian arsenal weighted 
over 48 poods (a bit under 800 kilograms), but in 1706 
a new regimental gun was created by Korchmin. Not only 
were the new guns half the weight of the older design, but 
they also had two six-pound mortars attached to the front 
of the carriage. These mortars were designed to launch gre-
nades and were to augment the piece when it was firing 
4 O. Leonov, I. Ul’ianov, Rehuliarnaia pekhota 1698-1801, 
Moskva 1995.
grape shot. As a rule, these two battalion guns were formed 
into a two-gun battery.
According to the Peter’s manual, Rules of Combat, 
a battalion was to deploy in the Anglo-Dutch model, that is 
in four ranks.5 Troops were trained to fire by volley or by 
platoons in the Prussian fashion. Like in the Swedish army, 
one out of every five soldiers was equipped with a pike. 
Unlike earlier formations in which the pike formed the cen-
ter of the unit and the musket armed troops were placed 
on the flanks, both the Russian and Swedish armies inter-
mixed their pikemen with their muskets. In such a way, the 
battalion was protected from cavalry and could maintain 
a significant volley of fire. This fire was also augmented 
with the fire provided by the battalion guns which were 
deployed with each regiment.
On paper, the regulation strength of a company was 
one hundred and fifty men.6 In 1704, the company was 
commanded by a captain and included one lieutenant, 
one ensign, three non-commissioned officers, one armorer, 
one doctor barber, one adjutant, one clerk, six corporals, 
two drummers, and one hundred thirty-three soldiers.7 
On campaign this number would have been reduced by 
sickness, battle casualties, and desertions. Estimates of the 
actual strength of each company vary, but using an average 
of one hundred to one hundred twenty five men suggests 
that each battalion could field approximately between four 
and five hundred men. 
Since each battalion was deployed in four lines, the front 
line or frontage consisted on the average of one hundred to 
one hundred and twenty five men per battalion. Using the 
smaller number of a hundred men frontage per battalion, 
the twenty-four battalions in the first line would represent 
a minimum of 2400 men. As an individual is widest at his 
shoulders, each individual would take up between thirty 
and forty centimeters. Given that the individual would 
be required to undertake a manual of arms, this frontage 
increases to fifty-six centimeters per person.8 Multiplying 
the space required for individual (56cm) by the minimal 
number of troops (2400), then we arrive at a figure of 1344 
meters for all the troopers standing shoulder to shoulder in 
one continuous line in front of the Russian camp. If we use 
the larger number of 125 troops in the first line of a battal-
ion, then we arrive at a distance of 1680 meters. 
Of course, no battalion would have been stood directly 
next to another unit. For the first part, the battalion guns 
would require space to deploy. Each two three-pound 
5 O. Sokyrko, Ukrains’kyj Rubikon: Poltavs’ka bytva 27 
chervnia 1709 g., Part 2, Kiev 2009, p. 15.
6 A. Konstam, Poltava 1709, Russia Comes of Age, London, 
1994, p. 21.
7 A. Konstam, Peter the Great’s Army 1: Infantry, London, 
1993, p. 17.
8 B. P. Hughes, Firepower: Weapons Effectiveness on the 
Battlefield, 1630-1850, Staplehurst, Kent 1997, p. 80.
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gun battalion battery had a crew of twelve men servicing 
the guns. While the number of infantrymen would rarely 
maintain its theoretical paper strength, gun crews were 
always brought up to full strength before the start of an 
engagement. Guns were too important to leave under-
manned and replacement gunners would have been taken 
out of the line to service the guns. If we follow the order of 
deployed battalions, then we can also calculate a frontage 
of the twelve three-pound regimental batteries that served 
on the front lines.
The exact dimensions of each three-pound battalion 
gun varied between designs, but on the average, the gun 
measured two meters from wheel hub to wheel hub. To ser-
vice the guns, its crew needed to move freely between the 
front and the back of the piece. This required at least one 
meter of space on each side of the gun. If we take the mini-
mum required space of four meters per gun, a minimum 
of eight meters in width is taken up by a single gun bat-
tery. Thus, the twelve battalion gun batteries had to take up 
a frontage of at least ninety-six meters. 
Taken together, the twenty-four battalions and twelve 
batteries of three-pound guns took up a frontage of approx-
imately 1440 to 1776 meters. From Peter’s plan, however, 
we also know that the cavalry was also deployed on the 
flanks of the infantry. At the time of the Poltava campaign, 
Peter had expanded his cavalry to thirty-four regiments of 
dragoons – eleven of these regiments were deployed to the 
right of the infantry and six on the left. Dragoon regiments 
were made up of ten or twelve companies, each of which had 
a paper strength of about one hundred men. Illness, fatigue 
and injured mounts would reduce this number to about 
seventy saddles per company. Two companies of dragoons 
formed a squadron. Cavalry regiments would also deploy 
in three ranks and maintained a frontage of four or at times 
five companies. If we take the minimum of a two squadrons 
frontage per dragoon regiment, we can calculate the space 
needed for deployment. 
Horses are notoriously hard to control, even at the 
best of situations. A perusal of any historical period 
were cavalry played an important role shows that horses 
often panicked and were almost impossible to stop after 
they began a charge. For this reason, cavalry manuals 
always seem to stress the need to slowly advance toward 
the enemy and work up to a charge in the last moments 
before contact. As the cavalry forces in Peter’s army were 
relatively new and poorly trained, especially when com-
pared with their Swedish counterpart, the Russian cav-
alry was trained to advance at the trot and discharge their 
firearms approximately thirty meters from their enemy. 
Once the initial volley had somewhat dispersed the enemy, 
the Russian cavalry manual stated that the troopers were 
to draw swords and advance at the trot. The school book 
emphasis of keeping such slow speeds was put into place 
so that the dragoons could maintain their unit cohesion. 
As the dragoons advanced, they strove not to leave any 
gaps between the men in the front lines and charged the 
enemy in the  classic  cavalry formation of riding ”boot 
to boot”.
Riding “boot to boot” theoretically is not to leave any 
spaces between the riders. However, even when riding in 
this formation, gaps of ten to twenty centimeters quickly 
emerge between riders. Given that a rider and his horse 
occupy approximately a meter wide frontage, in the field 
a single dragoon company would occupy approximately 
eighty-four meters. A single regiment would therefore 
occupy four times that space, or 336 meters. Thus, the 
right cavalry wing would require just under 3700 meters to 
deploy, while the left wings would take up a frontage of just 
over 2000 meters. 
Based on this analysis, the Russian army, according to 
the official records provided by Peter, would require a sig-
nificant amount of space to deploy. On the whole, the Rus-
sian army occupied a frontage of almost eight kilometers 
in length. If the cavalry were not deployed in line, but were 
placed one regiment behind another, this would reduce the 
initial deployment area significantly.
According to Peter’s Plan, the Russian army held the 
position of between the Takhtaulov Stream to the north 
and eroded streambed of the Iakivtsi Stream to the south. 
While the topography has been changed with the construc-
tion of a railroad cut in the eroded streambed of the Iakivtsi 
Stream, the distance between these two points of reference 
is under 1,800 meters. Given that the minimal deploy-
ment area for the infantry and supporting battalion guns 
is between 1,440 and 1,776 meters, the cavalry had little 
to no space to maneuver, much less deploy properly into 
line. Indeed, the infantry would be hard pressed and had 
no space to wheel in line. Perhaps the Russian deployment 
in front of the camp was a measure undertaken to give 
the Imperial Muscovite army room to deploy before being 
attacked by a professional and aggressive foe. 
Given the compacted nature of the Russian line and the 
descriptions of concentrated Russian fire, there was a strong 
indication that an archaeological battlefield survey would 
uncover large quantities of materials.9 Two senior scholars 
in the project had worked in areas heavily impacted by mod-
ern development and both had found traces of the former 
fields of conflict. Being aware of the ferocious nature of the 
battle, the amount of troops deployed, and the amount of 
ordinance expended, the team had envisioned finding huge 
deposits of spent ordinance. 
9 An invitation from V. Vadimov, the general city archi-
tect of Poltava, to Prof. M. Bevz, the Chair of the Department 
of Restoration and Reconstruction of Architectural Complexes at 
the National University “L’viv Polytechnic” resulted in the author 
visiting the battlefield. After a series of discussions and meetings, 
an international Ukrainian, American and Swedish team came 
together under my direction for two seasons and examined the 
numerous military conflicts that took place at Poltava.
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Unfortunately, this never occurred.10 Although we were 
able to recover a significant sample of spent ordinance, 
most of the military artifacts found on the area of the main 
battlefield came from the Second World War. Quantities of 
spent shell casings littered the battle areas, with spent 8mm 
Mauser cartridges being the most common artifact. Soviet 
Mosin-Nagant ammunition also was recovered in large 
quantities, as were spent 9mm pistol cartridges. Given the 
amount of ordinance expended on the Eastern Front, it was 
not surprising that we recovered an unexploded 76mm Ger-
man anti-tank round.
The recovery of WWII ordinance indicates that the 
local topography was not significantly modified in recent 
years. Earth moving projects, be it grading for a parking 
lot or the removal of topsoil, have become more prevalent 
with the advent of gasoline and stream powered machinery. 
Such grand projects were also very popular in the Soviet 
Union and used in two areas of the Poltava battlefield. In the 
area just to the south of the historical museum, the ground 
was moved and scrapped to construct protective earthen 
walled barriers for the aviation fuel storage facilities of the 
air force base. Yet for most of the battlefield, the recovery 
of distinct concentrations of fired ordinance not only lets 
us reconstruct German MG firing positions, but provides 
us with a clear indication that the earth was not subject to 
significant impact following 1945.
While the two seasons of metal detecting failed to 
recover hundreds of pieces of ammunition from the 1709 
engagement, those found provide a good sample to help 
us understand the battle. The overwhelming majority of 
rounds recovered were Russian.11 This is not surprising, 
as the Russian doctrine emphasized firepower and the 
Swedish practice of ga pa focused on maintaining momen-
tum during the advance. While some scholars have focused 
on the question of the quality and the available Swedish 
gunpowder, military theorists of the eighteenth century 
were loathed to have troops engage in a protracted firefight. 
Not only did this allow the attacker to suffer greater casu-
alties, but there was a great possibility that the initiative 
would pass and the charge would fail to materialize. 
An analysis of the ammunition showed two differ-
ent types of projectiles, lead small arms ammunition, that 
which would have been fired from muskets, pistols and 
carbines, and lead anti-personnel artillery ordinance which 
would have been fired from artillery. This anti-personnel 
artillery ordinance consisted of lead or at time iron balls 
10 A. Mandzy, Doslidzhennia poliv Poltavs’kukh bytv na zem-
liakh derzhavnoho-kul’turnoho zapovidnyka „pole poltavs’koi 
butvy”, „Arkhitektura, Visnyk natsional’noho universytetu 
L’vivs’ka politekhnika”, L’viv, No. 632, 2008, pp. 146-149.
11 A. Mandzy, M. Bevz, Kompleksne doslidzhennia isto-
rychnoho polia bytvy: metodyka i dosvid mizhnarodnoi arkhek-
turho-arkheolohichnoi ekspedytsii, „Fortress”, vol. 1, L’viv 2009, 
pp. 550-558.
held together in a cloth bag (grape shot), or a tin canister 
(canister shot). At close ranges, this ammunition made the 
cannon into a very large shotgun, as it disbursed hundreds 
of pieces of metal into the oncoming enemy. 
To date, eleven pieces of anti-personnel ammunition 
have been found on the main battle lines. This includes 
a pewter fragment from a canister round, nine lead pieces 
and one iron piece. The nine lead pieces can be divided 
into four categories, poured small rounds balls with a diam-
eter between 10.0mm and 13.4mm, folded cube shaped lead 
with a diameter of 13.3mm, poured cubes shaped pieces 
with a diameter between 15.3mm and 16.1mm and poured 
cubes between 19mm and 20mm. A fifth type of ordinance 
is represented by the recovery of a single cubed iron piece. 
While the sample size is too small for any useful statistical 
comparisons, the existence of five distinct groupings sug-
gests variations in the manufacturing and supply of artil-
lery based anti-personnel ammunition.
It is generally assumed that the artillery in Peter’s 
army played a significant role in the main battle.12 Given 
the special limitations for deployment faced by the Russian 
forces, the heavy artillery remained in the rear. Although 
the records indicate that they were raised on platforms and 
fired over the heads of the Muscovite troops, any such bom-
bardments would have made these direct fire weapons into 
mortars. While some of the guns in Peter’s arsenal were 
indeed specifically designed mortars, the majority were 
made to fire over open sights directly into the enemy in 
front. Such limitations in fields of fire were not unusual, and 
in the seventeenth century, heavy field guns were modified 
to achieve a much arc of fire by digging a hole to lower the 
back of the gun carriage into the ground.13 However, anti-
personnel ammunition could not be used in such a man-
ner. Given the irregular flight patterns of anti-personnel 
ammunition, neither canister nor grape shot could be fired 
into the enemy without causing significant casualties to the 
troops directly in front of the guns. Thus, the fragments 
of canister recovered were fired from the Russian three-
pound battalion guns that were stationed directly in front 
with the infantry.
The most commonly recovered battlefield related items 
found during this survey were musket balls. Made of lead, 
these projectiles were notoriously inaccurate and required 
groups to fire a volley at a mass target with the hope of pro-
ducing casualties. While some sources suggest that mus-
ket fire could be effective beyond 100 meters, a series of 
test run by the Prussian army during the Napoleonic wars 
found that the British musket, relatively the same model as 
used at Poltava in 1709, was able hit a man sized target at 
eighty yards only forty-seven percent of the time.14 Given 
12 J. V. Shokarev, Istoriia opuzhuia artilleriia, Moskva 2001, 
p. 76.
13 E. Wagner, Ars Bella Gerendi, Praha 1980, p. 163. 
14 G. Nafziger, Imperial Bayonets, London 1996, p. 32.
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that these were paper targets and the troops were not actu-
ally in combat, this number would have been significantly 
lower under real battlefield conditions. This theoretical 
exercise is supported by Griffith’s analysis of British fir-
ing patterns during the Peninsula Campaign (1809-1814).15 
Using contemporary source descriptions of the battles, 
Griffith argues that while musket firing could begin at 
ranges greater than 100 yards, British troop usually began 
to shoot at 75 yards.
The inaccuracies of firearms were well known in the 
eighteenth century. Troops were taught to give fire and 
aiming at individual targets was discouraged. Some leg-
endary commands like Frederick the Great of Prussia 
and Gustaph Adolphus of Sweden preferred to charge the 
enemy directly, rather than allowing their troops to fire and 
get drawn into a long firefight. Along with the ever-larger 
armies, European armies maintained the longstanding tra-
dition of employing small groups of marksmanship. Unlike 
the masses who were taught to fire blindly, marksmen 
trained and developed their skills from an early age. Marks-
men, usually hunters of game or members of urban shooting 
clubs, learned to increase the accuracy of the weapons by 
decreasing windage, i.e. the difference between the diam-
eter of the ball and the diameter of the barrel. As all weap-
ons were loaded from the barrel, the only practical way of 
reducing windage was to wrap the ball in greased cloth 
patch. As the loading of a patched ball often required the 
use of a hammer to push the round down the barrel, such 
loading was done previous to the start of an engagement. 
Traces of such a patch were noted on a ball recovered from 
the 1677 Landskrona Battlefield.16 A similar patch ball was 
recovered during the author’s excavation of the 1782 Battle 
of Blue Licks.17
To date, two Swedish musket balls were recovered at 
Poltava. While these balls are similar to some of the balls 
used by the Russians, the weight of the Swedish balls is sig-
nificantly greater. The Swedish balls, which have a diam-
eter of 18.8mm to 19.7mm, weight 35.3g and 37.5g respec-
tively. Russian balls of the same diameter are on the average 
ten grams lighter. Even largest Russian musket balls, one of 
which is almost 21mm in diameter, weighs 3 grams less 
than a Swedish ball which is 19.7mm in diameter.
The Russian ordinance recovered from our excavations 
is best described as mixed. From the small sample of fifty-
six balls, four or possible five distinct ammunition types 
were noted in the area of the Russian camp. Of these, round 
Russian balls were the most commonly encountered ammu-
nition. The other types of munitions recovered include: 
15 R. Muir, Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of 
Napoleon, New Haven 1998, p. 81.
16 B. Knarrström, S. Larsson, Hans Majestäts Friskyttar av 
Danmark, Stockholm 2008, p. 109.
17 A. Mandzy, E. Hale J. Marin, A Phase I Survey of the Blue 
Licks Battlefield, Frankfort 2008, p. 24.
extended sprue ordinance, two types of cold-hammered 
improvised munitions and slugs (Fig. 2).
Although it would be nice to always link a particular 
weapon based upon the diameter of an individual ball, both 
the nature of black powder firearms and contemporary 
manufacturing techniques resulted in bullets being made 
to rather loose tolerances. The British Brown Bess mus-
ket, which had a .75 bore, was to use a ball of 0.693-inch 
diameter, but in practice, balls in the range of 0.67 to 0.73 
are generally attributed to this weapon.18 In addition, not 
only were variations in the size of rounds balls common, 
but in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, differ-
ent size calibers were often used contemporaneously. For 
example, excavations of the wreck of the Swedish war-
ship Solen, which sank during the Battle of Oliwa on 28 
November 1627, produced 466 pieces of small arms ammu-
nition, of which four specific sizes were identified: 17mm 
(the most common), 14mm, 11mm and 21mm.19 
Thirty-one round balls were recovered from the main 
area. Some of these balls exhibit traces of casting sprues, 
but in all of these examples, the sprue has been cut very 
closely to the ball itself. The most common type of ball 
measured between 9.3mm and 11.8mm, with the majority in 
the 10mm range. These may relate to buckshot, that is mul-
tiple small balls fired out a larger caliber musket, or relate to 
smaller caliber weapons.20 A second possible concentration 
of round balls appears to be in the 14mm range, with bullets 
varying in size from 13.2mm to 15.8mm. A third possible 
grouping may exist between the 17.3mm to 19.0mm range. 
Though only four balls of this size were recovered, these 
balls are all significantly larger than the previous grouping 
and are thought to represent different weapons. Finally, the 
recovery of 12.1mm round ball and 20.8mm ball may rep-
resent the use of different weapon systems, but the single 
recovery of each size does not allow us to state much more 
than record their presence. 
In addition to round balls, seventeen balls were recov-
ered at Poltava with extended sprues. These are round 
balls with the casting sprue intentionally left on the ball. 
The recovery of impacted balls with visible sprues indicates 
that these rounds were fired with the sprues still attached. 
Unlike eighteenth century cartridges, where both the ball 
18 D. M. Sivilich, What the Musket Ball Can Tell: Monmouth 
Battlefield State Park, [in:] Fields of Conflict, ed. D. Scott, New 
Jersey 2007, p. 86.
19 A. Koperkiewicz, Solen, Gdańsk 1986.
20 Since most oriental „Turkish” weapons in the museums 
of Poland and Ukraine have a much smaller caliber bore than 
muskets, the initial study suggested that these bullets correspond 
with Ottoman weapons. Further analysis of Ottoman weapons 
captured by the Christian forces following the 1683 Siege of Vi-
enna by the author at the Heeresgeschichtliches Museum, how-
ever, suggests that many seventeenth century Ottoman weapons 
had a larger diameter than the Ottoman firearms commonly found 
in the museums of Poland and Ukraine. 
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and powder were inside a paper tube, makers of seventeenth 
century cartridges used the sprue to attach the ball to the 
paper tube. While such cartridges may have been in use by 
the mid-sixteenth century, in 1697, Saint Remy, a French 
scholar, “illustrated a cartridge with a ball attached by its 
sprue as the latest type.21
The presence of the extended sprue shifts the center 
of gravity of the bullet forward. This is the opposite of 
round balls, which have their center of gravity at the mid 
point. Like a modern air-gun pellet or skirted shotgun slug, 
the presence of the extended sprue adds additional weight 
to the bullet. Upon impact, the low velocity round will 
either split, creating two separate wound cavities, or tumble 
and make a much larger hole than would a round ball of the 
same caliber.
The most common sprue ordinance recovered from the 
main battle area of Poltava has a diameter between 14.6mm 
and 16.3mm. Ten of such size ordinance was recovered, 
with six balls displaying a diameter of 15mm. A second 
possible grouping of balls measures between 17.3mm and 
18.6mm, but with only four balls recovered, it is difficult 
to say anything with certainty. The recovery of a single 
extended sprue ordinance ball with a diameter of 21.6mm 
is interesting, but again the lack of additional balls of this 
size does not allow for further speculation. 
21 P. Surirey de Saint Remy, Memoires d’Artillerie, second 
edition, Vol. 2, Paris 1707, as quoted in Harold L. Peterson, Arms 
and Armor in Colonial America 1526-1783, Harrisburg, Pennsyl-
vania 1956, p. 64.
Excavations of other battlefields in Ukraine and Swe-
den have recovered similar extended sprue ordinance. Exca-
vation of the 1649 Zboriv battlefield by the author found 
extended sprue ammunition in two sizes.22 The most com-
mon rounds have a diameter between 12.6mm and 13.3mm. 
These are the most common type of seventeenth century 
small arms ordinance recovered at Zboriv and make up 
almost fifty percent of the assemblage. Less common are 
the slightly larger rounds that have a diameter of 14.1mm to 
14.7mm. Larger caliber weapons do not appear to have used 
sprue ammunition and utilized the more traditional round 
ball pattern. 
A similar situation was noted during the author’s exca-
vation of the 1649 Zbarazh battlefield.23 Fought just days 
previous to the Battle of Zboriv by many of the same Cos-
sack and Tatar troops, it was logical to assume that we would 
discover similarities between the two assemblages. Indeed, 
not only did we find that two sizes of extended sprue ordi-
nance and the three diameters of round ball ammunition 
noted at Zboriv were all recovered at Zbarazh, but as in 
Zboriv, the percentages between the different types and 
sizes of ammunition were very similar. The only difference 
between the ammunition from the two sites was the recov-
ery of large round lead balls from the Zbarazh battlefield. 
22 A. Mandzy, Tatars, Cossacks, and the Polish Army the 
Battle of Zboriv, [in:] Fields of Conflict…, pp. 193-207.
23 A. Mandzy, Doslidzhennia oblohy Zbarazha 1649 r., 
„Dezhava ta Armiia, Visnyk natsional’noho universytetu L’vivs’ka 
politekhnika”, L’viv, No. 571, 2006, pp. 124-130. 
Fig. 2. Lead projectiles recovered 
at Poltava battlefield and recreated 
ammunition. 1 – Extended Sprue 
Ordinance; 2 – jug-shaped ammuni-
tion; 3 – slug; 4-5 – examples of re-
created jug shaped rounds made by 
cold hammering round lead balls.
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These large balls measure in diameter between 20.4mm 
and 20.6mm.
The presence of sprue ammunition indicates that the 
Russian troops at Poltava were using cartridges. The use 
of cartridges simplified the loading process and resulted in 
a faster rate of fire. Previously, musketeers relied upon ban-
doleers of pre-measured powder charges. Bandoleers were 
cheap to produce and continued to be found in European arse-
nals until the end of the seventeenth century. Infantry car-
tridge boxes, however, were new and were in use in Ukraine 
as early as 1649.24 Russian troops first began to use leather 
cartridge boxes in the last years of the seventeenth century 
under the direct reforms implemented by Peter. 
The two types cold-hammered ammunition are rare and 
may have only been used in this engagement. Both of these 
types appear to have been modified to fit smaller size diam-
eter barrels. The first type of modification begins by taking 
a standard extended sprue ordinance ball and cold hammer-
ing it on its sides to reduce the balls diameter. Although 
lead is a rather soft substance, it is difficult to directly 
hammer the ball. Rather than directly hammering the ball 
straight on, the ball was hammer on an angle. This proce-
dure shifted the lead away from the sprue and produced 
a jug shaped bullet, with the sprue creating the “mouth” 
of the jug-shape. The three recovered jugs had their diame-
ters reduced to 15.8mm, 16.3mm and 16.6mm respectively. 
The second modified type of ordinance appears to 
have been hammered on all sides. This technique seems 
to be cruder than the jug style balls and was made by cold 
hammering a round ball to produce a multi-sided bullet. 
The lack of a sprue by which to hold the ball when ham-
mering would have made it more difficult to modify the 
shape of this ammunition and the three recovered pieces all 
are slightly wider one on side. The three recovered pieces 
measure 14.8mm, 15.9mm and 17.4mm. 
The modified cold hammered balls suggest a tem-
porary solution to supply the Russian troops in the field. 
While it is possible that these modifications were done to 
increase the lethal power of the more rounded bullets, it is 
more likely that these modifications were done so that the 
issued balls could fit down the barrel of a soldier’s weapon. 
The lack of standard weapons and correspondingly, stan-
dard barrel diameters, was a well known feature in Peter’s 
army. Since it would have been nearly impossible to deliver 
the correct size ball for each individual firearm, each indi-
vidual trooper would have needed to make allowances for 
such discrepancies. If the delivered balls were too small, 
they still could be shoved down the barrel and while not 
as accurate as a correct sized round, they still would be 
24 The recovery of extended sprue ordinance at both Zboriv 
and Zbarazh document the use of paper cartridges in 1649, while 
the recovery of actual leather and wood cartridge boxes from 
the 1651 Berestechko battlefield illustrates their common usage. 
I. K. Sveshnikov, Bytva pid Berestechkom, L’viv 1993.
lethal at a point blank range. This philosophy of military 
logistics remained prevalent in Imperial and later Soviet 
military planning, and arms production was set up so that 
capture ordinance could be used with Russian arms (i.e. the 
Soviet 82mm mortar was designed to fire the 81mm NATO 
mortar rounds). 
If the issued balls were too larger however, then steps 
would be needed to ensure the ammunition would work. 
Cold hammering of rounds would ensure that the issue balls 
would fit down the barrel of each firearm – and it did not 
matter if the gun was a modern French import, an older 
weapon from Holland or recently produced arm from one 
of the Tzar’s new arsenals. Since the tools and skills required 
to produce these modifications could be easily applied in 
the field, it is most probable that these modifications were 
undertaken to address the logistical issues that plagues 
Peter’s newly created Western-styled military force. 
The final type of ammunition recovered from the 1709 
battlefield is cylindrical shot, also known as a slug. Whether 
these poly-sided balls were cold hammered from a piece of 
cut lead rod or from a slightly larger ball is impossible to 
tell, but unlike the hammer round balls described above, 
no part of the bullet is wider than the other. Such bullets 
are periodically encountered at seventeenth and eighteenth 
century assemblages and the two slugs recovered at Pol-
tava had a diameter of 13.7mm and 15.8mm respectively. 
At the 1651 Berestechko battlefield, for example, a num-
ber of cylindrical pieces of lead, along with scrap pieces 
of lead, were recovered from an ammunition pouch attrib-
uted to fallen rebel peasant.25 The recovery of ten cylindri-
cal bullets and fifteen round balls from a cartridge box at 
the 1690 Anse aux Bouleaux shipwreck is a good indica-
tion that these munitions were used by New England militia 
troop on their way to attack Canada.26 Five slugs were also 
found in a leather pouch on the pirate ship Whydah which 
sank in 1717.27
At Poltava, it appears that the Russian army used all 
types of bullets in its various weapons. If we were to com-
bine all the ammunition together and sort it by diameter, 
we are not much closer to discerning any distinct patterns. 
While we can see some clustering of diameters, one with 
a range between 14.1mm and 16.6, and a second range 
between 9.3mm and 11.8mm, these bullets represent still 
only make up sixty-five percent of the total assemblage. 
The diversity of recovered bullet diameters is truly remark-
able and illustrates an army using every possible firearm 
that it could get its hands on.
When Peter began to reform his army, the troops used 
a variety of weapons and no regulation patterns existed. 
25 I. K. Sveshnikov, Bytva pid Berestechkom…, p. 254.
26 http://www.mcccf.gouv.qc.ca/phips/wreck19b.htm 
27 D. M. Sivilich, G. W. Stone, The Battle of Monmouth: The 
Archaeology of Molly Pitcher, the Royal Highlanders, and Colo-
nel Cilley’s Light Infantry, Freehold 2003, p. 18.
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Local production of weapons was limited to the Kremlin 
Armory and most weapons were either matchlocks or used 
the newer Baltic lock snaphaunces. Peter’s efforts in estab-
lishing local centers of arms production is well docu-
mented, with weapons being produced in Tula, Moscow, 
Olonetz and Petersburg. The monarch’s interest in modern-
izing his military also lead to his purchasing of arms in 
Western Europe, especially Amsterdam. Within the Rus-
sian army, the infantry firearms could be have been made 
by the Dutch, English, French, Muscovites or any other 
production center. 
This inconsistence in firearms was noticeable at the 
regimental level. Sizes, weights, and calibers of weapons 
varied and no standardization existed. According to Peter’s 
notes, infantry muskets were to fire an eight zolotnik ball 
(approximately 34g.), but how often this was achieved is 
debatable. According to Aleksandr Ianovych, the for-
mer director of the National Historical Cultural Preserve 
“Fields of the Battle of Poltava”, among a surviving his-
torical arms in the Tula Arsenal that date to the time of 
the Poltava campaign is a musket with a 16mm bore. Yet 
how common was the caliber from this individual firearm 
remains speculative. 
In the Russian army, standardization of weapons 
continued to be a long-term problem. While the capture 
of large quantities of Swedish arms would go a long way 
of replacing the oldest and least effective firearms, the army 
that Peter created would continue to be plagued by weapon 
shortages on and off for the next few hundred years. Given 
the vast numbers of troops in the Russian military, similar 
disparities would show up during times of crises. During 
Napoleon’s invasion, various weapons were pressed into 
service, including captured French muskets, purchased 
British muskets, and even war trophies taken from cam-
paigns against the Turks. But the development of a theo-
retical standardized round indicates a move toward greater 
standardization. 
Conclusions
So what does the information recovered from the 
main battle line tell us about the battle? For the first part, 
we know that the Russian army was confined in a spot that 
was very narrow, too narrow in fact to properly deploy the 
cavalry. The lack of any archaeological evidence for large 
caliber cannon, such as those that would have been part 
of the artillery train, also supports the fact these cannons 
were employed in a supporting role at best and were not 
used to their full potential. Finally, the recovered ammuni-
tion tells us that the Russian Army was truly using a wide 
variety of ammunition. Unlike the Swedes, who main-
tained a standard ammunition caliber, the Russians were 
forced to use whatever weapons came their way. Indeed, the 
lack of standardization of ammunition into distinct sizes 
is a good indication that the firearms used by the troops 
were also not standardized. However, the use of extended 
sprue ordinance also demonstrates that while the firearms 
and ammunition supply may not have been standardized, 
the new Russian army was adopting cartridge boxes and on 
the path to modernization. 
Streszczenie
Użycie uzbrojenia i długość linii frontu: 
nowe dowody w sprawie głównej rosyjskiej linii bojowej pod Połtawą (1709 r.)
Dwa sezony badań pola bitwy pod Połtawą dostarczyły 
nowych informacji na temat szwedzkiego ataku na główne 
siły rosyjskie. Prace terenowe wykazały, że armia rosyj-
ska była ograniczona wąską przestrzenią i nie była w stanie 
w pełni wykorzystać swojej kawalerii i artylerii. Analiza 
pocisków do broni ręcznej wykazała szeroką różnorodność 
kalibrów i rodzajów używanej amunicji. Dwa typy poci-
sków wydzielone podczas badań nie zostały dotychczas 
znalezione na innych XVII- lub XVIII-wiecznych polach 
bitew. Badania wykazały, że wojska rosyjskie modyfiko-
wały ołowiane kule poprzez zmniejszenie ich średnicy 
w celu dopasowania do używanej broni palnej, natomiast 
stosowanie pocisków z nieusuniętym kanałem wlewowym 
sugeruje, że rosyjska armia była dopiero w trakcie wprowa-
dzania do użytku ładownic.
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